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Legal scholars guided the creation and development of privacy
torts, including what would become known as the disclosure tort,for
about seventy-five years (1890-1965), a period in which most states
came to recognize a common law or statutory right to privacy. Since
then, scholarly attempts to curb or modify the tort have yielded little.
This Article-beginning with the formalism-realism debate won by
Brandeis, Pound, and Prosser and ending with modern expertsshows that notwithstanding enormous efforts by contemporary legal
academics, would-be reformers of the disclosure tort have not budged
it since Prosser's Restatement (Second). The Article presents both a
lesson and a warningfor modern scholars who seek to change privacy
tort law.
INTRODUCTION

Legal scholars, frustrated by their growing inability to attract
judges' attention with ambitious ideas in law reviews,' have recently
tried a new approach to changing doctrine: they have exponentially
increased their amici curiae filings to the Supreme Court and,
presumably, to other courts. 2 The Justices often do not even read
these briefs, and although law clerks perceive scholar filings as more
credible than most others, 3 there is little indication in most cases that
the academy affects rulings.4 Scholars have not always had such
difficulty impacting the law. Less than a century ago a law professor
might have expected to have his views-even in law review articles1. See Brent E. Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the TwentyFirst-Century Supreme Court Justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV.
399, 415 (2012) (noting precipitous decline in Supreme Court citations to law
reviews).
2. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars' Briefs and the Vocation of a Law
Professor,4 J.LEGAL. ANALYSIS, 223, 223-26 (2012).

3. Id.
4. A potential, but still notable, exception is the suspected impact Robert
Cooter and Neil Siegel's Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax
Power, 98 VA. L. REv. 1195 (2012) had on Chief Justice Roberts's decision to view
the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate as a valid tax, in addition to the
apparent impact that Randy Barnett and friends had on the commerce clause analysis
in that decision. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Forward: Academic Influence on the
Court, 98 VA. L. REv. 1189, 1190 (2012).
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heard by judges and, depending on the professor and the court,
followed. Development and solidification of the public disclosure of
private facts tort (the "disclosure tort" or "PDPF") typifies the effect
scholars can have on the law under proper conditions. The history of
scholars' attempts to modify this tort since about 1965, however,
demonstrates the inability of scholars to practically change relatively
settled doctrine, even in the controversial area of common law
privacy.
The disclosure tort, recognized in most states as one of four
privacy torts,' is simply defined but practically thorny--due mainly to
First Amendment concerns. Under the tort's definition, a defendant is
liable for invasion of privacy if she publicizes a private matter about
the plaintiff that is not of legitimate public concern and is highly
offensive to a reasonable person in the plaintiffs shoes. 6 In practice,
it is difficult to determine what is not of legitimate public concern, so
courts generally err on the side of protecting speech whenever public
interest is arguably involved.'
In this Article, I explore the history of the disclosure tort by
tracing scholarly attempts to affect it over time.8 The tort's story,
perhaps sadly for modern academics,9 is one of scholarly creation and
5. These are intrusion, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false
light, and appropriation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
6. Id. § 652D (1977).
7. See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Bowley v. City of Uniontown Police Dept., 404 F.3d
783 (3d Cir. 2005).
8. For a good social history of privacy generally, see Samantha Barbas, Saving
Privacyfrom History, 61 DEPAUL L. REv. 973 (2012).
9. Modem scholars are not likely chagrined by the tort's doctrinal stagnation
since the 1960s if they haven't really been trying to change it. If "American law
professors think of themselves as writing primarily for other academics . . . to

formulate new accounts of law and law's social impact and to defend those accounts
within the scholarly community," Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American
Contract Law: Classical and Contemporary, 12 lus GENTIUM 121, 141-42 (2006);
see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1314,
1321-22 (2002), then they probably don't mind that judges ignore their articles. I
assume, however, that scholars mean what they say, and many have said that they
want the disclosure tort to change in practice. It is true that some articles are written
to engage other scholars rather than judges, but, as shown in Part III, infra, there is
no shortage of theoretical and practical proposals directed at changing the bench's
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initial definition only. Beyond the work of Warren and Brandeis,'o a
few key scholars during the tort's early development," and Prosser in
the Restatement (Second), the tort has belonged to judges following
established doctrine-judges who ignore millions of words written in
protest and pleading by the last half-century's would-be reformers.
The articles and blog posts keep coming, but neither modem tort
scholars nor First Amendment guardians, despite triumphant
headlines,' 2 have expanded, eliminated, or substantially modified this
cause of action. Perhaps this is an example of path dependence or
scholarly irrelevance; perhaps it is one of persistence that will pay off
with future reforms. Whatever the trend illustrated by scholars'
attempts, the early history of this tort is a stark example-possibly
replicable by modem scholars willing to build doctrine in emerging
areas-of the power of academia, properly placed in time and social
sentiment, to craft the law.
To reach these conclusions, I examine in Part I the roots of the
disclosure tort as part of an undefined concept: the vague, monolithic
"invasion of privacy" tort inspired by Warren and Brandeis. During
this prefatory era, courts and scholars considered the invasion of
privacy as nothing more than the use of another's image in advertising
without consent. The tort lived this constrained early life for two
formalistic reasons, both of which were largely overcome by the late
1930s: (1) the general prohibition against equitable relief for nonproperty torts; and (2) the pervasive denial of legal actions based on
mental suffering.
Part II explores the second period of scholarly influence, from the
late 1930s to 1965. This period saw the evolution from the first
Restatement of Torts, which gave a cloudy definition of the invasion

view of the disclosure tort.
10. Cf Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path:
Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 124-125 (2007) (arguing
that, contrary to the views of many, Warren and Brandeis did not create the law of
privacy; they merely redirected an already-robust body of privacy law).
11. See infra Parts I-II.A.
12. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461 (2000); J.R. Rolfs, Note, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of the End
for the Tort ofPublic Disclosure, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1107 (1990); Lorelei Van Wey,
Note, PrivateFacts Tort: The End Is Here, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (1991).
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of privacy, to the four-tort privacy battery in the Restatement
(Second). Thanks in large part to William Prosser, the disclosure tort
was defined and packaged, ready for courts to adopt-which most
have done.
Part III explores the scholarly doldrums from 1966 to the present,
a period with many First Amendment attacks on the disclosure tort,
some calls for its abolishment, and a few proposals for expansion.
Despite the thousands of pages written to change the tort, sparse
clarifications of its limits have come only from Supreme Court cases
in which the Court took little advice from post-Prosser scholars. In
short, the disclosure tort remains Prosser's. The inability of modem
academics to change it might be attributed to neo-conceptualism
pervading the legal academy or to the path-forming power of the
Restatement, leading judges to accept tort doctrine as established
while ignoring academic commentary. Whatever the reason for their
modem impotence regarding the disclosure tort, scholars who want to
change the common law should either seek unsettled doctrinal
territory, where judges are still willing to listen, or mount massive
popular campaigns that even judges cannot ignore.
I. FROM WARREN AND BRANDEIS TO POUND, GOODRICH, AND THE
FIRST RESTATEMENT
A. 1890: Warren and BrandeisIntroduce the Right to Privacy
The Right to Privacy, written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis in 1890, is one of the most cited law review articles in
history. Multitudes of scholarly pieces and judicial opinions point to
that short work as giving birth to the privacy torts, and articles have
even been written to validate that Warren and Brandeis did, indeed,
first conceptualize the privacy right generally.13 While it was
recognized even in 1890 that something akin to privacy was
protected,14 this recognition is generally coupled with respect for
13. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis & Warren's The Right to
Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REv. 623, 623-25 (2002).
14. Warren and Brandeis themselves tried to convince their readers that the
right to privacy already existed and that it just needed more recognition and
definition. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
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Warren and Brandeis as having made familiar and actionable what
was before faintly inequitable. 5
Popular attention to the idea of privacy protection grew with the
expansion of urbanity, portable "snap" cameras, and sensationalist
yellow journalism.16 Warren and Brandeis played on these themes in
their article, and legal scholarship triumphantly changed the law
within a few decades, though not in the way envisioned by those
scholars.' 7 That attempt would have to wait for Prosser, and even
then, privacy protection in tort was arguably more limited than what
Warren and Brandeis proposed.18
Samuel Warren's sensitivity to press reports of his private lifethe curse of marrying a senator's daughter-is said to have led to The
Right to Privacy.19 From the display of merely personal information
to the publication of family tragedies, Warren's anger apparently rose
from a mixture of what we would now call intrusion and disclosure of
private facts.2 0 Indeed, The Right to Privacy itself mainly proposed
what have become the torts of intrusion and disclosure, and, to a lesser
extent, false light: "[T]he existing law affords a principle from which
may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion
either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor
of any other modern device for rewording or reproducing scenes or
sounds." 2 1 Unwilling to advance an unlimited concept, and seeking
credibility by exuding balance and objectivity, Warren and Brandeis
confined their privacy tort within the basic free speech and free press
boundary that still surrounds it: matters of public interest are not
L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
15. See, e.g., Richards & Solove, supra note 10, at 124.
16. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 195-96.
17. Infra Part I.B.
18. See Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63
VAND. L. REv. 1295 (2010).
19. Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn't Married a Senator's
Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led to "The Right to Privacy,"
2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 35 (2008).
20. On the presumed facts, the episode giving rise to The Right to Privacy
would not have risen to the level of allowing a disclosure claim due to a lack of
offensiveness.
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 206.
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protected against disclosure. 22 This boundary-with the later rule that
actionable facts must be outrageouS23 l-has been the main limitation
on disclosure claims since the early twentieth century, and certainly
since the Supreme Court has been involved in the privacy tort's
development.
Given the authors' focus on disclosure, it might seem odd that
such claims remained unavailable for decades after 1890. Instead, as
soon as Warren and Brandeis released the privacy tort, it fell into a
one-track rut of compensating people for having their likeness used
for advertising purposes.2 4 Rather than intrusion or disclosure, the
concepts at which the article chiefly aimed, The Right to Privacy's
first success was what we now call appropriation-the only theory
hardly intimated by Warren and Brandeis. 25
Why? The formalist legal world was unprepared for a tort that
sought redress for mental anguish (something that could not officially
be the basis for damages) and that rarely contained an anchor in
property (something required for an injunction). These limiting
vestiges of history stymied early disclosure claims,2 6 so legal realists
22. Id. at 214-15.
23. Warren and Brandeis do not appear to have considered this potential
limitation. Rather, they approached the right to privacy as being similar to a
copyright: if A does not have permission to publish a photo of B, then A cannot do
it, even if B is portrayed in a positive or innocuous light. Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 14, at 213-14. The creation of the outrageousness requirement is, in my view,
the most significant limitation to Warren and Brandeis's conception of privacy
protection.
24. Infra Part I.B.
25. Id.
26. Warren and Brandeis recognized this latter limitation, comparing mental
suffering of invasion and public disclosure to the property-derivative torts of libel
and slander: "[T]he wrongs and correlative rights recognized by the law of slander
and libel are in their nature material rather than spiritual. That branch of the law
simply extends the protection surrounding physical property to certain of the
conditions necessary or helpful to worldly prosperity. On the other hand, our law
recognizes no principle upon which compensation can be granted for mere injury to
the feelings." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 197. Further, as to the former
limitation, Warren and Brandeis (unlike Roscoe Pound, later) did not attempt to
create a blanket right of injunction to prevent invasion or disclosure, instead
recommending that, in addition to damages in all cases, there be allowed as a
remedy "[a]n injunction, in perhaps a very limited class of cases." Id. at 219.
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had to rectify inadequacies in the common law before the privacy tort
could grow enough for Prosser to classify its subparts. Scholars
played a key role in remedying both defects.
B. The Privacy Tort's Toddling Steps: Early Scholarly Calls and
GruffJudicialResponses
"Classicism taught thatjudges should apply common law doctrines
with relentless logic, without allowingfor exceptions based u on
new socialpropositionsor the harshness ofparticularresults.'
In 1934, the American Law Institute published a nebulous
definition of privacy in the first Restatement of Torts: "A person who
unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not
having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the
public is liable to the other." 28 Notwithstanding the definition's
failure as an intelligible demarcation of legal principles, it marked the
expansion of the privacy tort beyond what some called its "strictly
limited" application to a "single stereotyped set of facts." 29 The first
Restatement's definition meant release of the privacy tort from the
two barriers that had fenced it into appropriation. Thus, though
unclear, the new definition was a major victory for legal realists, who
sought to allow law to reflect society without mechanical application
of past principles. How did the realists overcome these two obstacles
by 1934?
1. Overcoming the FirstBarrier(No Injunctionsfor
Non-PropertyInjuries)
Warren and Brandeis struck a populist note, but turn-of-thecentury courts trod gingerly on the new privacy ground. Two
questions had to be answered: first, does the right to privacy exist at
all? Second, if the right exists, how should it be protected?

27. Movsesian, supra note 9, at 121.
28. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
29. George Ragland, Jr., The Right ofPrivacy, 17 KY. L.J. 85, 85 (1929).
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In Schuyler v. Curtis,3 0 the nation's most prominent state court
began to answer these questions. Although the court declined to
repudiate a common law right to privacy, it suggested that the right
would be corralled within traditional remedies. Schuyler involved the
stepson of a woman whose name and image the Woman's Memorial
Fund Association used to create a statue memorializing "woman as
philanthropist." 31 The statue was to be paired with one of Susan B.
Anthony paying homage to "woman as reformer."32
Ms. Schuyler had indeed been a philanthropist, but she was
intensely private and, perhaps more importantly, did not sympathize
with Anthony or the woman's rights movement.33 After Schuyler died
and her family learned of the statue and World's Fair exhibit, her
stepson, seeing that the Association would ignore his requests, took
Warren and Brandeis's article to court seeking an injunction.3 4 The
trial court granted the injunction, finding that the defendants had
interfered with the privacy of Ms. Schuyler's relatives. 35 The
Supreme Court at General Term affirmed, but the Court of Appeals
reversed (long after the World's Fair had passed without Ms.
Schuyler's statue).3 6 In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the
dead had no right to privacy and the living were not entitled to an
injunction because "the feelings of any sane and reasonable person
could [not] be injured by the proposed act. . ." so long as the "real and
honest purpose is to do honor to the memory of one who is
deceased ..

."37

Nascent as the right, the court had not yet attached

30. Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895). The case spurred a flurry of
scholarly commentary. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other
Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,96 GEO. L.J. 123, 146 & n.157 (2007).
31. Schuyler, 42 N.E. at 22.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Augustus N. Hand, Schuyler against Curtis and the Right to Privacy,
36(12) N.S. AM. L. REG. 745, 752 (1897) ("Indeed, [Warren and Brandeis] may
flatter themselves with having pointed the way for both court and counsel in the
Schuyler case.").
35. Schuyler v. Curtis, 24 N.Y.S. 509, 510 (1893).
36. Id.
37. Schuyler, 42 N.E. at 26-27.
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the property anchor to the right to privacy, and instead decided the
case on its merits.
The importance of this case, pointed out by the young privacy
defender Augustus Hand, was that while the Court of Appeals
denied the injunction, the court did not deny that a right to privacy
existed. Instead, it held that the right was not so impinged as to merit
equitable relief, leaving the door open for privacy torts.3 9 Schuyler,
however, sent a signal that plaintiffs should anchor their claim to
property and stay within traditional remedies that could garner
appellate panel majorities.
These factual limitations, while restrictive, kept alive
conversations between academics and appellate judges on whether the
right to privacy existed and, if so, how it should be protected.
Although privacy had its proponents, such as Hand, scholarly
detractors would soon become instrumental in taking the New York
court from a measured reaction to privacy in Schuyler to complete
rejection a few years later.
One of the most important, if fledgling, 40 detractors was Herbert
S. Hadley. Hadley argued that equity jurisdiction could never protect
personal privacy; any protection of privacy must be by legislatures,
not courts.4 ' Still a student while Schuyler was being decided, he said
flatly:
The writer believes the right to privacy does not exist; that the
arguments in favor of its existence are based on a mistaken
understanding of the authorities cited in its support; that the
jurisdiction of courts of equity does not on principle recognize the
right to privacy, the right to be free from personal unpleasantness;
that equity has no concern with the feelings of the individual or
38. Augustus, cousin to Learned, would become a judge for the Southern
District of New York and then the Second Circuit. GREAT AMERICAN JUDGEs 311
(John R. Vile ed., 2003).
39. Hand, supra note 34, at 751.
40. Hadley graduated from Northwestern Law School the same year he
published his critique. He later became the Missouri Attorney General, a law
professor, and chancellor of Washington University. Herbert S. Hadley, ABOUT
WUSTL, http://www.wustl.edu/about/facts/chancellors/hadley.html (last visited Jan.
15, 2013).
41. Herbert S. Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1895).
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with considerations of 'moral fitness' except as the inconvenience
or injury that a person may suffer is connected with the enjoyment
orpossession ofproperty.4 2

Although the New York Court of Appeals did not refer to
Hadley's recent article until seven years later, Hadley framed the
debate between the legal formalists (who would be displaced after
considerable protest) and the legal realists (who would take a
comparatively practical and policy-oriented approach to equity's
ability to protect personal rights).4 3
Hadley began his article with a protracted history of English
equity jurisdiction, applauding the early shift away from individual
chancellors' fairness decisions to a categorized system of tenable and
untenable equity claims. 44 He then argued that privacy fell into none
of the tenable categories for two reasons. First, unlike copyrights to
the products of one's mind, a person has no property interest in his
privacy. 45 And second, "the common law does not recognize mental
anguish as a ground for damages except where a physical condition
results as the proximate cause of the act producing the anguish. . . ."46
His strict view of equity jurisdiction established, Hadley applied
formalism to privacy by contending that Warren and Brandeis's call
for privacy to protect personality "must rest upon the assumption that
equity is a shifting, ambulatory system of jurisprudence which is to be
exercised in any case where the relief asked for seems to meet the
conscience of the Chancellor..

.

. [E]quity is not such a system . ...47

It is notable, of course, that Hadley had extolled evolutionary changes
to equity by giving its history, but his central point-a goal common
to "legal scientists"48 -was that tort law should reach and remain in a
42. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
43. G. EDWARD WHITE, -TORT LAW
expanded ed. 2003).
44. Hadley, supra note 41, at 4-7.

IN AMERICA

64-75 (Oxford Univ. Press

45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 8-9.
48. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 43, at 55 (noting that legal science maintained
conflicting premises that the law is in flux but that legal principles should be
established and applicable to all cases).
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state of stable classification with little need for additional, previouslyunavailable privacy claims.
Thus, after arguing that the dicta relied on by Warren and
Brandeis did not support a right to privacy but rather a right to private
property, Hadley claimed that people's personal feelings had not been,
and therefore should never be, protected by courts of equity. 49 He
concluded that advances in American civilization lead to new legal
developments "not because new principles and new rights are created
to afford that protection or redress which seems to be required" but
because "new occasions and new circumstances arise which come
within the principles upon which our laws were founded."5 0 In other
words, new harms recognized by society have to conform to existing
law or be borne by the harmed. The law should never conform to new
injuries.
A more faithfully formalistic statement has never been made, but
formalists were not the only legal thinkers at the time. Certainly, the
legal realism movement had not taken hold by 1900,51 but its central
tenets were whispered in earlier legal scholarship to support the right
to privacy. For example, in addition to Augustus Hand, in 1898 Guy
Thompson argued-in true realist manner-that Justice Cooley's
"right to be let alone" was a natural right regardless of property
interest and that equity jurisdiction should protect it in response to
society's demands. 52
By 1902, however, the divided New York Court of Appeals had
Ignoring Hand and
read and agreed with Hadley's article.
Thompson's emerging infidelity to formalism, the court decided
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company by rejecting a right to

49. Hadley, supra note 41, at 3-4. Hadley cites Corliss v. Walker Co., 57 F.
434 (D. Mass. 1893) as a rightly reasoned decision on the matter. He fails to note,
however, that the case falls squarely into one of Warren and Brandeis's exceptions:
public interest. In Corliss, the plaintiffs were the family of the deceased but famous
inventor of the Corliss engine, and the defendant was a would-be biographer of
George Henry Corliss.
50. Hadley, supra note 41, at 20-21.
51. According to Professor White, realism's influence did not mature until
about 1910. WHITE, supra note 43, at 64.
52. Guy Thompson, The Right ofPrivacy as Recognized and Protectedat Law
and in Equity, 47 CENTRAL L.J. 148, 154 (1898).
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privacy altogether.5 3 In that case, a milling company used the image
of an attractive girl in advertisements and on flour bags without her
consent.54 Ridiculed as the "flour girl," she spent days in bed with
nervous shock.5 5 When she sued the company for damages and an
injunction, the trial and intermediate appellate courts held that her
right to privacy had been infringed. 56 The Court of Appeals
reversed.
Chief Judge Parker,58 in a starkly formalist majority opinion, first
noted that "[t]here is no precedent for such an action to be found in the
decisions of this court ... . Mention of such a right is not to be found
in Blackstone, Kent or any other of the great commentators upon the
law . .

59

Parker then, likely as a strategic move (had he presented

the privacy proposal fairly, his opinion would have been difficult to
write), garishly exaggerated the protection proposed by Warren and
Brandeis as allowing everyone to "pass through this world, if he wills,
without having his picture published, his business enterprises
discussed, his successful experiments written up for the benefit of
others, or his eccentricities commented upon ...6o
Such a principle
would lead "not only to a vast amount of litigation, but litigation
bordering upon the absurd.. .. "6
53. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). The
Court of Appeals has never changed its mind, making New York one of six states to
deny common law privacy. See infra Part III.B.
54. Id. at 442.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 443.
57. Id. at 448.
58. Alton Parker left the court in 1904 to run for President as the Democratic
nominee. He lost in a landslide to Theodore Roosevelt. During the campaign,
distressed that reporters were following him on his daily swim in the Hudson and
everywhere else, he complained at their intrusion. In response, he received a warm
letter from Ms. Roberson exposing his hypocrisy and reminding him "you have no
such right as that which you assert." FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE
400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST CONTESTED RIGHT 68-69 (2009).
59. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 443.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 444-45. As discussed in Part III, this fear is not justified, even under
the free speech restriction suggested by Warren and Brandeis, as this restriction, in
the form of newsworthiness, provides little incentive to bring a disclosure case

244

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

With his precedential and policy arguments established, Parker
cited young Hadley and borrowed his tactics. He countered Warren
and Brandeis's history by portraying equitable jurisdiction as
protective only of private property and suggesting that the legislature
alone could protect "the so-called right to privacy." 62 As for the
common law, libel offered sufficient remedy for those seeking redress
for malicious publication. 63
Judge Gray, in his famous dissent, summed the budding realist
counter to Hadley and Parker perfectly:
[T]he absence of exact precedent and the fact that early
commentators upon the common law have no discussion upon the
subject are of no material importance in awarding equitable relief.
That the exercise of the preventive power of a court of equity is
demanded in a novel case, is not a fatal objection. 64
Notwithstanding his failed attempt to expand equity to protect noncontractual property, Judge Gray and his fellow dissenters, along with
scholars like Thompson, affected the common law in other states and
the statutory law in their own. 65
Thus, despite formalist 66 resistance, other states' high courts,
starting with Georgia's, 67 followed Judge Gray's suggestions to
unless the facts are just right.
62. Id. at 443.
63. Id. at 448.
64. Id. at 449 (Gray, J., dissenting).
65. The New York legislature was so disappointed with Roberson that they
immediately passed Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, prohibiting the
unauthorized use of another's portrait for commercial gain and allowing for both
injunctions and damages in these cases. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51
(McKinney 2011). Although New York has never recognized the disclosure tort
under common law, the legislature has added Sections 50a-50e, protecting such
things as people's HIV status, identity of rape victims, personnel records of police
officers, etc.
66. Formalists generally sought to systematize and ossify legal principles,
making them static, reliable, and beyond political considerations as society changed.
67. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78-79 (Ga. 1905).
Some state courts followed New York, however. See, e.g., Henry v. Cherry, 73 A.
97, 108 (R. I. 1909).
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maintain a palatably narrow right to privacy. They did this by
recognizing the right and by giving limited, property-based answers to
the question of how to protect it.
The Georgia Supreme Court, explicitly following Judge Gray's
dissent-along with more than a dozen law review articles, decided
Pavesich v. New EnglandLife Insurance Company in 1905, just three
years after Roberson.6 8 Pavesich was, like Roberson, a case of a
company profiting by the unauthorized use of a portrait, and many
courts soon adopted the right to privacy under these limited facts,
issuing injunctions to protect people's images from advertisers and
copyrighters. 69 That is, the second question of the age was narrowly
answered: as long as a property interest is involved, tort can protect
privacy. These property-based decisions were small steps toward the
disclosure tort and privacy rights as we know them, but they were
necessary to open formalism's rusty door.7 0 Notwithstanding this
progress toward redressing privacy invasions, by 1916 Harvard's
68. Pavesich,50S.E.at78-81.
69. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 533 (Kan. 1918); Vassar Coll. v. Loose-Wiles
Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912) (applying state law to determine that
college had insufficient property right in its name to enjoin chocolate maker from
using it); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912) (holding that, where
photographer took unauthorized photos of dead conjoined twins and got copyright
on the image, father could sue for damages); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076,
1079 (Mo. 1911) ("one has an exclusive right to his picture, on the score of its being
a property right of material profit."); Foster v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909);
Note, Right of Privacy: Nature and Extent of Right, 26 HARV. L. REv. 275 (1913)
(discussing cases, and Douglas v. Stokes in particular). Even the Supreme Court
weighed in, by analogy: "A man's name is his own property, and he has the same
right to its use and enjoyment as he has to that of any other species of property."
Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 544 (1891). "If a man's name be his
own property, as no less an authority than the United States Supreme Court says it
is[,] it is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of one's features is not also
one's property. . . ." Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J.
1907).
70. In a 1910 case survey made in the Yale Law Journal, the anonymous
author concluded: "injury to property, in some form, is an essential element to
relief." Note, The Right of Privacy, 20 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1910). See also Note:
PossibleInterests in One's Name or Picture, 28 HARv. L. REv. 689 (1915) (arguing,
in a realist argument couched in formalist terms, that many privacy interests are
property interests for which injunctions should be allowed, but "[o]nly in so far as
the law recognizes these interests are legal rights created.").
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Roscoe Pound was tired of sluggish evolution and called for
widespread recognition of realistic privacy principles.
i. Pound's CallforExpanded Injunctive Relief
The realist movement being anything but coherent, Pound was a
proponent of sociological jurisprudence and an opponent of Karl
Llewellyn, the Yale professor who coined the term "realism." 7 Yet
Pound was still a realist in the broad sense: 72 a present-thinking antiformalist and proponent of practical jurisprudence that could adjust to
societal change. Indeed, even before his 1930-31 academic debates
with Llewellyn, Pound was intently focused on practical changes in
the law. For example, in 1916-the year he became dean of Harvard
Law School-he wrote Equitable Relief against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality.73 In the article's capacious second section, he
sought to expand injunctive privacy protection from property to
person. Whereas the courts that recognized privacy had purported to
follow Georgia's Pavesich by issuing injunctions only to protect
property interests in the commercial value of portrait and identity,
Pound challenged the notion that injunctions against privacy invasion
should be reserved for property interests alone.74
Ever the botanist, he created categories of cases in which "equity
in truth secures personality, although purporting to secure substance
only," showing that courts in equity already were protecting
personality (but calling it property). Categories included publication
of embarrassing but monetarily worthless letters, fraudulent use of a
husband's name to affix to the birth certificate of a child conceived in

71. See, e.g., N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN:
SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998).

72. Professor Hull, too, ultimately saw Pound and Llewellyn under the same
roof: "Apparently at odds, Pound and Llewellyn were searching for the same grail,
and their search had taken them in roughly the same direction. Sociological
jurisprudence .. . was close indeed to legal realism." Id. at 223.
73. Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to
Personality,29 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916).
74. Id. at 668-77.
75. Id. at 671.
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adultery, and wrongful, public expulsion from social clubs.' 6 Pointing
out this under-the-table equitable privacy protection, he concluded:
Relief against injury to privacy and related wrongs involves
unsettled questions as to the existence and scope of the legal
right.... But we have proceeded long enough upon fictions and
"technical bases" of jurisdiction. A century of judicial experience
since the cautious dicta and bold action of Lord Eldon in
Gee v. Pritchard[in which unauthorized publication of a
monetarily worthless letter was enjoined] has taught us much.
More is to be gained by perceiving critically the interests to be
secured and the conflicting interests to be balanced against them, by
looking the difficulties squarely in the face and by determining
what may be done to secure and protect individual personality in
view of the difficulties, than by continued lip service to a doctrine
laid down only to be evaded.
Thus, Pound, appealing to judges' sense of professional honesty,
called for a clearer definition of the right to privacy and for expanded
equity protection of that right. His call did not go unnoticed in the
courts.7 8 Defining the right and giving it more protection took time,
but the first barrier fell.79
2. Surmounting the Second Barrier (No Damagesfor Mental Harms)
For decades after Warren and Brandeis's article, compensation for
emotional harm was strictly parasitic to damages for physical injury.8 0
76. Id. at 670-76.
77. Id. at 682.
78. See, e.g., Stark v. Hamilton, 99 S.E. 861, 862 (Ga. 1919) (holding that
father had both property and personal privacy interest, protected by equity, in
daughter not being held as a prostitute); Snedaker v. King, N.E. 15, 23 (Ohio 1924)
(citing Pound's article in dissent of judgment that wife could not be granted
injunction preventing husband's paramour from communicating and associating
with him).
79. This process of acceptance and definition is best chronicled by Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 385-87 (1960).
80. See, e.g., Archibald H. Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L.

REV. 260, 266 (1921) (arguing that fright leading to physical injury, including
nervous shock, should be actionable, but "[t]he mere temporary emotion of fright
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Yet privacy torts generally, and the disclosure tort in particular, could
not have emerged without damages for mental harm. This is because
the right to privacy is the right-if not to the property of one's story,
reputation, or image-to be free from unwarranted mental injury
induced by unauthorized publication of intimate matters.
By 1922, however, Dean Herbert Goodrich" was ready to
propose standalone compensability of mental injury. The law did not
place mental and physical injury on the same plane, so Dean Goodrich
began by speaking the critics' language: rather than calling for
recognition of mental injury as compensable mental harm, he drew in
the skeptics by arguing that mental injury was physical. He argued:
"It would ... help us in solving legal problems arising from claims for
damages arising through emotional disturbance of a plaintiff... if we
kept ourselves familiar . .. with what medical men and psychologists

are finding out about emotion and its effect on the human body." 82
After establishing that fear and other emotions, such as anger,
worry, and grief, produce harmful physical disturbances-and
therefore should be included in categories of legal damage 83 Goodrich moved on to the problem of how to assign money damages
to mental harm without too much speculation. Quickly dispelling this
difficulty, he called it "no more difficult a problem here than in any
case of non-pecuniary damage-a broken leg or a bruised head."8 4

not resulting in physical injury is, in contemplation of law, no injury at all, and
hence no foundation of an action.").
81. Dean Goodrich was, in 1922, the dean of Iowa Law School, but he was
made professor of law at the University of Michigan the same year. He would later
serve as dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, after which he was
appointed to the Third Circuit and became director of the American Law Institute.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=882&cid=
26&ctype=ac&instate=03 (last visited April 3, 2013). In this last position, he was a
close coworker of William Prosser. John W. Wade, William L. Prosser, Some
Impressions and Recollections, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1255, 1257-58 (1972)
(incidentally, Wade would succeed Prosser as Reporter). Prosser and Goodrich
shared some ideology, as shown by Prosser's own article on the recognition of
mental injury, discussed below. See infra note 95.
82. Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbanceas Legal Damage, 20 MICH.
L. REv. 497, 497 (1922).
83. Id. at 497-504.
84. Id. at 503.
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Measurement is, as with any other injury, a simple matter of tracing a
given cause to a given effect and proving the price of the effect.8 5
Borrowing Pound's technique of showing the courts that they already
do what he was recommending, Goodrich pointed out "how far courts
have already gone
in making feelings a matter of
recovery.... [Mental] injury is compensated." 86 This, as with
Pound's argument,8 7 is Goodrich's convincing force. Mental suffering
was traditionally compensated as parasitic to physical and property
injury, but independent actions for assault, malicious prosecution,
defamation, wrongful arrest, seduction, and unlawful search and
seizure were all based on mental suffering.88
Concluding, Goodrich argued that what was then parasitic would
in the future be "recognized as an independent basis of liability."8 9
The floodgates of litigation would not be opened wide to all injuries,
as judges would prudently divide injury from pettiness, just as they do
when denying recovery in trivial nuisance cases. 90
Despite his efforts, by 1929 most jurisdictions still did not allow a
cause of action based on mental anguish alone.9 1 The tide was
turning, however, and two law review articles in the 1930s marked the
recognition of courts and scholars that mental harm was harm enough
to support a tort action. 92 Further, the 1934 Restatement included
"the interest in freedom from emotional distress," which was a
statement ahead of the common law. 93
The first article was written by a Vice Dean of Harvard Law
School, Calvert Magruder. In 1936, Magruder wrote Mental and
Emotional Disturbancein the Law of Torts,94 where he painstakingly
85. Id. at 503-04.
86. Id. at 509.
87. See supra note 74 and surrounding text.
88. Id. at 510.
89. Id. at 511.
90. Id. at 511-13.
91. J.E.C., Note, Damages: Recovery for Mental Suffering Alone, 15 VA. L.
REV. 575, 576 (1929).
92. See infra notes 94-98.
93.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§ 46 (1934).

94. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbancein the Law of Torts,
49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936). Perhaps importantly, Magruder had clerked for the
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built on Goodrich's and others' expositions of the inconsistency of the
common law's recognition of mental suffering in some instances but
not in similar or more deserving situations. 95 Explicitly building on
Magruder's piece, Prosser, then a law professor at the University of
Minnesota, proposed formal recognition of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, which courts had already established without
saying as much.9 6 Magruder and Prosser assumed one of Goodrich's
main concerns: that mental suffering is compensable suffering. They
had no reason to waste paper arguing that contention because, at that
point, so many courts had already recognized mental suffering as
compensable. Instead of speaking to judges in the words of Darwin
and other physiologists, as Goodrich did, they had the luxury of
speaking to judges in the words of other judges, focusing on the scores
of cases in which courts had redressed mental and emotional anguish
generally (in Magruder's article) 97 or with regard to outrageous
behavior causing emotional shock to another (in Prosser's). 9 8
These academics, along with Goodrich and others, 99 interacted
with litigants and judges to expand privacy torts. They chipped away
both the prohibition against injunctions for non-property injuries and
the skepticism of mental injury, allowing for growth of privacy
generally and, later, the disclosure tort.
Prince of Privacy himself: then-Justice Louis Brandeis. Cite Magruder did mention
privacy in his emotional disturbance article, but it was not the focus. Magruder,
supra.
95. Id. at 1036, nn.11-13 (citing various articles, including Roscoe Pound,
Interests of Personality in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 87, 103

(Harvard L. Rev. Ass'n 1924); Francis H. Bohlen & Harry Polikoff, Liability in New
York for the Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbance,32 COLUM. L. REv.
409 (1932); Throckmorton, supra note 80.
96. William L. Prosser, IntentionalInfliction ofMental Suffering: A New Tort,
37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939).
97. See, e.g., Magruder,supra note 94, at 1033-41.
98. See, e.g., Prosser,supra note 966, at 881-86.
99. Some articles even connected expanding protection for mental and
emotional distress with privacy concerns. See, e.g., Gerald Dickler, The Right to
Privacy: A Proposed Redefinition, 70 U.S. L. REv. 435, 435 (1936); Fowler V.
Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-Examination of the Basis for Liabilityfor
Emotional Distress, 1938 WIs. L. REv. 426, 445-64 (1938); Basil W. Kacedan, The
Right of Privacy [Part 1], 12 B.U. L. Rev. 353, 353 (1932); Basil W. Kacedan, The
Right ofPrivacy [Part II], 12 B.U. L. REv. 600, 619, 645 (1932).
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PROSSER AND THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
OF PRIVATE FACTS

By 1940, while legal realism was declining as the dominant force
behind tort theory, it's approach of adapting law to society had taken
hold and stood in stark contrast to the rigid rules of Hadley and
Parker's day.' 00 Louis Nizer summarized the difference well:
The privacy doctrine has been handicapped in its development by
the fact that it came into being after the common law had been
fairly well crystallized. Many judges who were trained merely to
apply the law as they found it ignored the tradition underlying our
Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence and failed to apply the
principles behind existing rules to new situations as they arose.
Consequently the doctrine was hampered by the inability of some
courts to accept the idea that it is not an interloper but a fullfledged, socially acceptable member of the legal family. 0 1
With a zeitgeist more suited to adaptation, scholars and judges
encouraged the development of privacy torts. The mid-century
approach was markedly different than that of the early 1900s. One of
the main differences was that the right to privacy was ordinarily
assumed and only its boundaries, underlying interests, and resulting
The period saw, in addition to
protections, were debated.102
100. WHITE, supra note 43, at 157-58.
101. Louis Nizer, The Right to Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39
MICH. L. REv. 526, 559 (1941). This is a strong rebuttal against Hadley's contention
that the common law was and had long been static, ignoring the "Anglo-Saxon
system" of legal evolution by common law.
102. It is arguable that privacy was seen with widespread inflexibility even
until 1938, when Professor Francis Bohlen (himself the Restatement Reporter from
1923-37) said:
Fifty years ago the right which every normal and decent person
feels in living his life to himself appeared likely to be protected by
a legal recognition of a right to privacy. Unfortunately the
campaign for its recognition brilliantly begun by the article written
by Justice Brandeis and published in the HarvardLaw Review has
almost completely failed. A very minor protection against the
commercial exploitation of one's personality is given by decisions
which are based upon the idea that one's personality may have a
material value for advertising purposes. To this extent one has a
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expanding the concept of privacy to film, television, radio, etc., a
division of common law privacy into four distinct torts. 0 3
A. Pre-ProsserScholarshipand JudicialResponse
Prosser, the most influential categorizer of privacy torts, was not
the first.' 0 4 Perhaps it was Leon Green, the dean of Northwestern Law
School, who initially attempted to classify the types of interests and
harms involved in privacy actions.10 5 Keeping Warren and Brandeis's
three interests (personality, property, and interpersonal relations) as
his main categories, he placed various sub-interests under the heading
of each, in addition to identifying three types of harm to privacy that
courts had already implicitly recognized.10 6 His effort, a good first
classificatory step, categorized these interests and harms under the
heading of a single privacy tort.
After Green, the first serious attempt to divide privacy into
distinct torts appears to be that of the young Gerald Dickler in 1936.107
Bucking the vague Restatement definition, 0 s he divided the privacy
torts into three categories: (1) trespass-related "intrusions"; (2) libelrelated "disclosures"; and (3) unfair trade practices-related
"appropriations."l 09
Citing dozens of law review articles and
sufficient property interest in one's personality to make it proper
to prevent the unpermitted publication of one's picture as an
advertisement of another's wares.
Francis H. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 731 (1937) (footnote
omitted). Yet the stage was set by this time-thanks to the availability of
injunctions and damages for mental harm-for privacy torts to expand rapidly.
103. See infra II.A.
104. Of course, he was not the last, either. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A
Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
105. See Leon Green, The Right ofPrivacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932).
106. Id. at 238.
107. Wolfgang Saxon, Obituaries: Gerald Dickler, 86, Lawyer Who Aided
Artists, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/18/
nyregion/gerald-dickler-86-lawyer-who-aided-artists.html.
Interestingly, he would
later lead the American Broadcasting Corporation-one of the largest media outlets
in the nation and a beneficiary of the Supreme Court decisions discussed in Part III.
Id.
108. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
109. Gerald Dickler, The Right to Privacy: A ProposedRedefinition, 70 U.S.
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commentaries to prove a negative,"l0 Dickler wrote of the ignorance
of bar and bench to what he saw as clear categories. He called for
recognition of something beyond "the same formless embryo which
Warren and Brandeis discerned forty-six years ago,""' and his
categories were not ignored. In fact, they coincided directly with
three of Prosser's four privacy torts, proposed twenty-four years
later. 112

Now that the barriers of equity and mental damages were no
longer insurmountable, scholars pushed for consensus in light of-and
in hopes of shaping-the case law. Thus, in the 1940s and 1950s,
scholars and judges more freely debated the need for and boundaries
of the privacy torts (such as public interest in information disclosed,
the effect of waiver/consent, etc.),113 but many courts were still
granting redress for privacy violations under the guise of some other
right.1 4 Long gone, however, was the debate between formalists and
the emerging realists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth

L. REV. 435, 435 (1936).
110. Id. at 436.
111. Id. at 456.
112. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
113. See, e.g., Wilfred Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy,
48 COLUM. L. REV. 713 (1948) (noting that privacy protection was expanding in
cases and that boundaries were emerging); Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in
Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553 (1960) (arguing
that right to privacy in appropriation cases should be seen as right to be free from
commercial exploitation rather than right to be let alone); Frederick J. Ludwig,
"Peaceof Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REV. 734
(1948) (advocating uniform privacy law); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954) (arguing, with Second Circuit,
that right to privacy does not adequately address needs of public figures seeking
publicity); Leon R. Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope, and
Limitations, 27 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 519-20 (1952) (giving nine-point list of
right of privacy, its scope and limitations); Case Note, Right of Privacy-Effect of
Lapse of Time and Distortion of Fact, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 664 (1952) (discussing
boundaries of limitation that right to privacy does not extend to publication of
details of one's involvement in crime or calamity; exploring Third Circuit opinion
that distortion of pedestrian's involvement traffic accident, used twenty months after
accident in magazine article incorrectly implying that pedestrian was at fault, could
be basis for liability).
114. Ludwig, supra note 11313, at 757-58.
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centuries. The two decades leading to the development of the second
Restatement saw boisterous waves of ideas, proposals, and
classifications-all while more courts adopted the right to privacy." 5
B. Prosser's1960 Article and the Restatement (Second)of Torts
By 1960, the courts of twenty-seven states had recognized the
right to privacy in some form, with a few others expected to recognize
it soon.116 Four jurisdictions had recognized privacy by statute, and
only a few courts had rejected privacy protection as unbecoming the
common law." 7
Thus, just as he did with his well-received
intentional infliction of emotional distress proposal, Prosser waited
until most jurisdictions agreed with him before declaring the existence
of, and clearly describing, four new torts.
Marshaling convincing evidence and nodding to fellow privacy
scholars, he stated: "It is only in recent years, and largely through the
legal writers, that there has been any attempt to inquire what interests
are we protecting, and against what conduct. Today, with something
over three hundred cases in the books, . . . some rather definite
conclusions are possible."" 8 Then, one-upping Dickler, Prosser
proposed and detailed four distinct privacy torts: intrusion, public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light, and
appropriation."19 Supported by judicial opinions, Prosser-as he and
others had done to change the fortunes of privacy in the past' 20 argued that courts had already recognized these four torts without
saying so; the only thing lacking was a bit of systemization.

115. These were the days of mass recognition of the right of privacy. No
longer did courts have to protect privacy by calling it something else. As mentioned
infra in Part III.B, many states were adopting the right.
116. Prosser, supra note 112, at 386-88. Such a proudly simple title displays
Prosser's confidence.
117. Id. Some of these states, such as Texas, reversed course later and now
recognize privacy in the common law. See, e.g., Michael Sewell, Invasion ofPrivacy
in Texas: Public Disclosure of EmbarrassingPrivate Facts, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REv. 411 (1995) (detailing the short history of disclosure tort in Texas).
118. Prosser, supra note 112, at 388-89.
119. Id. at 389.
120. See supra Part II.A.
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Prosser recognized that Warren and Brandeis were mostly
concerned with the public disclosure of private facts, but he also
recognized that such privacy protection was "slow to appear in the
decisions."' 2 1 He traced the disclosure tort from debtor cases (in
which a creditor publicly displays the debtor's debt and the time it has
been overdue) to broadcasting cases (in which a screenplay or radio
dramatization is based on a person's private life) 122 and finally to
various oddities that fit comfortably into his definition of the
disclosure tort.123 He then gave its plainly evident limitations: the
disclosure must be public;124 the facts must be private;1 25 the matter
must be one that, if made public, "would be offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities." 26
Finally, he applied the public figure and public interest limitations,' 27
along with the consent defense,' 2 8 to all four of his torts, recognizing
that interpretation and social values might further shape these limits.
After publishing his instantly classic Privacy article, Prosser, the
Restatement Reporter, ensured that his four-part framework would
become part of the second Restatement, ending the thirty-year reign of
the first Restatement's unworkable privacy definition. 129 Thus ended
the era of one imprecise tort that was once ahead of its time and began
the era-in which we still live-of four somewhat less imprecise torts,
Like those who changed the first
fresh and organized.130
121. Prosser, supra note 112, at 392.
122. For a discussion of unauthorized media portrayals, see Peter L. Felcher &
Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the
Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1978).
123. Prosser, supra note 112, at 392.
124. Id. at 393.
125. Id. at 394-96.
126. Id. at 396-98.
127. Id. at 410-19.
128. Id. at 419-20.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 652A-6521 (1977). The Invasion
of Privacy division of the Restatement (Second), part of Volume 3, was not
published until 1977-five years after his death. Before resigning in 1970, however,
he had submitted drafts for the Advisers. Id., Introduction to Volume 3, at VII.
130. The Restatement (Second) defines the disclosure tort:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind
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Restatement's definition, scholars have attempted to change Prosser's
conception of privacy and the disclosure tort for decades, but they
have failed.
III. 1960-PRESENT: LARGE, INEFFECTIVE QUANTITIES
OF SCHOLARSHIP

As explored below, 13 ' scholars have written mountains of research
and suggestions attempting to make their mark on the disclosure tort.
As of now, however, the elements given in the Restatement (Second)
are generally followed. Since Prosser, the one major change to the
tort has come from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has
established that where facts disclosed are in public record (for
example, an unsealed indictment or publicly available police report),
they are of defacto newsworthy public concern and cannot be limited
by the state without narrow tailoring to a state interest of the highest
order.132 This newsworthiness defense has narrowed the tort, but
successful disclosure suits have nonetheless been on the rise.1 33
A. Scholarly Proposals,Attacks, and Suggestions
Path dependence -might best explain the disclosure tort's
immobility over the last fifty years.' 34 Because of the persuasive force
that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.§ 652D (1977).

131. See infra Part III.A.
132. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495-97 (1975) (holding that,
where reporter obtained name of rape victim from copy of indictment given to him
by clerk of court, statutory rape shield liability disallowed because "States may not
impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official
court records open to public inspection."); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,
541 (1989) (holding that, where reporter got rape victim's name from public police
report, newspaper could not be subject to statutory rape shield liability because
statute was not "narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order").
133. John A. Jurata, Jr.,, The Tort that Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle
Reemergence ofPublic DisclosureofPrivate Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 509
n.132, 510 (1999) (noting that after Florida Star, from 1993-1999 alone, at least 21
plaintiffs prevailed; only 18 had prevailed prior to 1980).
134. For a description of three common law strands of path dependence (here,
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of the Restatement (Second) and the spreading notion of privacy
protection noted by Prosser in 1960, courts quickly established the
privacy torts as precedent 135 -something that was hardly possible
under the first Restatement's boundless definition. During this era of
consensus legal thought and, from about 1970 onward, what Professor
White calls "neoconceptualism" (a somewhat realist spirit of
categorization that resulted from decades of consensus-seeking among
scholars), 136 the disclosure tort's relatively simple elements were
engrained in precedential documents that continue to guide application
of the tort to new problems and technologies.1 37
This explanation is unsatisfactory in light of the scholars who
overcame path dependence a hundred years ago to create the torts in
the first place-using the same methods of conceptualization, case
gathering, analogy, and proposals to stretch or modify existing
practice. The likely complicated answer to why scholars have failed
over the past fifty years to buck Prosser will be left for another day.
The purpose of this subpart is not to explain but to expose modem
scholars' failure to do what their predecessors did: change the
disclosure tort.
Below is a sampling of the post-Prosser concerns, hopes, desires,
and demands by tort and constitutional scholars, as "free speech and
press" has become a rallying cry for disclosure tort opponents.
it seems the first-"Increasing Returns Path Dependence," with characteristics of
large setup costs leading to falling unit costs as output increases; learning and
coordination effects, and self-reinforcing or adaptive expectations-is most
applicable), see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 606-22
(2001).
135. See, e.g., Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 327 (Ala. 1961);
Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 213-214 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla.
1961); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 287 (Idaho 1961); Yoder v.
Smith, 112 N.W. 2d 862, 863-864 (Iowa 1962).
136. WHITE, supra note 43, at 211-43.
137. Many high courts expressly used the rubric of RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652(D) (1977) in this era. See, e.g., Com. v. Wiseman, 249 N.E. 2d
610, 615 (Mass 1969); Vogel v. W. T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 135-36 (Pa. 1974);
Rawlins v. Hutchinson Pub. Co., 543 P.2d 988, 991 (Kan. 1975); Indus. Found. of
the S. v. Texas Indus. Acc. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 683-84, n. 22 (Tex. 1976); Nelson
v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Me. 1977).
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Through it all, though, the tort has remained remarkably stable, even
growing in acceptance from state to state while remaining a purposely
limited'3 8 cause of action that arguably lacks flexibility for the digital
age.
1. Concerns Based on Tort Theory
Early on, Dean Wade, who would take the Reporter helm from his
friend Prosser, commented on the possibility that the disclosure tort
(giving redress for a true outrageous statement) and false light (giving
redress for a false outrageous statement) would so blend with
defamation as to swallow it up. He found this proposition suitable,
given that he saw defamation as holding on to too many antiquated
restrictions.13 9 He also predicted, however, that the disclosure tort and
false light (along with defamation, assault, etc.) would be engulfed by
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, creating a
"system of protecting plaintiffs peace of mind against acts of the
defendant intended to disturb it."' 40 Thus, Wade saw the disclosure
tort as a small piece of a whole that would someday take shape in a
clear ordering of protection against mental suffering. This hasn't
happened. Disclosure, assault, defamation, and false light all still
exist as distinct torts.141
Another early challenge to Prosser's conception of the tort was
Professor Bloustein's counter-theory, which labeled Prosser's fourpart classification a "congeries of discrete rules" that "offends the
primary canon of all science that a single general principle of

138. It appears that Prosser intentionally limited the disclosure tort to prevent
it from overwhelming defamation and IIED. Richards and Solove, two privacy
activists, are quite displeased with Prosser and the restrained course he set for us.
Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser'sPrivacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889-90 (2010).
139. John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right to Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV.
1093, 1093-96 (1962). As mentioned in note 138, supra, Prosser did not likely share
Wade's worry, as Prosser guided the tort to avoid conflicts with defamation and

IIED.
140. Id. at 1125.
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 21 (assault), 558-623
(defamation), 652D (disclosure), 652E (false light) (1977).
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explanation is to be preferred." 4 2 First, Bloustein noted that Prosser
was "by far the most influential contemporary exponent of the
tort.... [H]is influence on the development of the law of privacy
begins to rival in our day that of Warren and Brandeis."1 43 With this
justification for not ignoring Prosser, whose four-part concept was
already in the Restatement drafts, Bloustein said that "if [Prosser] is
mistaken, as I believe he is, it is obviously important to attempt to
demonstrate his error and to attempt to provide an alternate theory." 144
Alleging that Warren and Brandeis would not support Prosser's
taxonomy, Bloustein argued that the four torts (and some crimes) were
really one, with a single underlying interest: to protect a person's
dignity. 145
If defendant invades plaintiffs privacy through
inappropriate information gathering or dissemination, torts (such as
intrusion or disclosure) or crimes (such as illegal wiretapping) are
based on violation of "personal dignity and integrity" alone.14 6
Bloustein contended that privacy is a monolith, and should be,
because that is how Warren and Brandeis, rest their souls, would have
wanted it. 147 Bloustein's article garnered attention, 14 8 even in
Supreme Court cases,1 49 but the disclosure tort nonetheless became
part of the Restatement (Second).

142. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 963 (1964).
143. Id. at 963-64.

144. Id. at 964.
145. Id. at 971.
146. Id. at 981-82.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., People v. Geever, 522 N.E.2d 1200, 1209 (Ill. 1988); Koeppel
v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Iowa 2011); Weeren v. Evening News Ass'n, 152
N.W.2d 676, 680 (Mich. 1967); Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475,
477 (Mo. 1986); French v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 430 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Or. 1967);
Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 680 n.3 (Wash. 1982) af'd, 467 U.S.
20 (1984).
149. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572 n.8 (1977);
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 n.15 (1975); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 n.42 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 n.9, 404
(1967).
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Like Bloustein, various scholars have attempted tort-based
reform' 50 of the disclosure tort, and some have even defended it."
150. See, e.g., Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A
Historical Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 172-73 (2010) (describing
why newsworthiness defense has all but swallowed disclosure tort); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919-22
(2005) (arguing that PDPF should be flexibly expanded to cover modem social
networks); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking about You, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1122 (2000) (arguing that PDPF, even if a property right, is
speech restriction under First Amendment; First Amendment concerns generally
should trump PDPF goals); Joseph Elford, Note, Trafficking in Stolen Information:
A "Hierarchyof Rights" Approach to the Private Facts Tort, 105 YALE L.J. 727,
748-49 (1995) (arguing that because PDPF is failing under First Amendment, it
should be replaced by new tort); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy
Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 1133,
1136 (1992) (arguing that emphasis of PDPF should be shifted from control over
publication to duty of confidentiality imposed on private information holders); Peter
B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost ofJustice Black, 68 TEX.
L. REV. 1195, 1223 (1990) (arguing that Supreme Court was wrong in Florida Star,
which ends PDPF); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy: Community
and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 993-95 (1989) (arguing
that requirement in the Restatement (Second) of "public" disclosure ignores
underlying values); Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Resurrecting a Sunken Ship: An Analysis
of Current JudicialAttitudes Toward Public Disclosure Claims, 38 Sw. L.J. 1151,
1184-85 (1985) (arguing that courts should stop dismissing many disclosure cases
on summary judgment, allowing jury to determine whether plaintiff had reasonable
expectation of privacy in disclosed information); W.A. Parent, A New Definition of
Privacyfor the Law, 2 LAw & PHIL. 305 (1983) (arguing that Prosser's four torts
were poorly conceptualized; privacy needs to be redefined); Thomas I. Emerson,
The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329,
348-49 (1979) (arguing that injunction, as prior restraint on speech, should never
occur in PDPF cases); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 233, 234 (1977) (arguing that PDPF allows for too much interpretation and
therefore little usefulness); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the
Constitution:Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutionalas Well?, 46
TEX. L. REv. 611, 625-29 (1968) (arguing that individual privacy can only be
invaded by mass publication when publication is relevant to purposes of selfgovernment); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966) (arguing that "tort law's
effort to protect the right of privacy seems to me a mistake.").
151. See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The "New " Privacy and the
"Old": Is Applying the Tort Law of Privacy Like Putting High-Button Shoes on the
Internet?, 17 CoMM. L. & POL. 107 (2012) (arguing that balance struck between
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The most salient attempts at change have been those of Richard
Posnerl 52 and Neil Richards & Daniel Solove.153 They have attempted
not to create minor adjustments to disclosure but to reform the judicial
approach altogether.
In his quest for economic efficiency, Posner, in 1977 and again in
1981, proposed that information be seen as a good within a
marketplace in which more information is better than less, but in
which nobody has a right to information meant to conceal fraud or
misrepresentation, either in the commercial or private context. 154
Protections, like the disclosure tort, allow people to shield their fraud
and misrepresentation, preventing others from making informed
choices. 1ss Thus, the disclosure tort should be limited only to those
situations in which someone's character is not being unmasked and
where transaction costs to selling property rights are prohibitively
high (such as when an unknown person is photographed as part of a
large group). 5 6 Unmasking misrepresentations is always efficient,
privacy torts and First Amendment is sufficient to address complicated privacy
problems in Internet Age).
152. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 46, 660-63 (1998);
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AMER. ECON. REV. 405 (1981);
Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1978);
Richard A. Posner, The Right ofPrivacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1977).
153. Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 357 (2011); Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, supra note 18 at 1347-52;
Richards & Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law, supra note 138; Neil M. Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy,
supra note 104; Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy
Protections against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967 (2003); Daniel J. Solove,
ConceptualizingPrivacy, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1087 (2002).
154. Posner, The Right of Privacy, supra note 152; Posner, The Economics of
Privacy, supra note 152. But see Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy Is Dear at Any
Price: A Response to Professor Posner's Economic Theory, 12 GA. L. REV. 429
(1977) (arguing that Posner is pretentious and immodest: his economic theory and
privacy analysis violate Ockham's razor by inviting plurality without necessity and
by ignoring complexity (by overemphasizing misrepresentation and concealment of
one's past) where necessary). For another property-based approach, see Richard S.
Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996) (arguing that PDPF fails because it does not
recognize that private information is marketable property).
155. Posner, The Right ofPrivacy, supra note 152, at 395-97.
156. Id. at 414.
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even if one is unmasked against one's will.157 However, where a
publisher is to profit by the disclosure of facts about someone, the
revealed person has a property interest in the information and should
be compensated for its disclosure.' 5 8 Finally, from an efficiency
standpoint, privacy meant to encourage innovation (similar to what
others have called "intellectual privacy"l 5 9) should be protected
beyond privacy meant to misrepresent.16 0
Richards and Solove, recognizing Prosser's service,' 6 ' see the
disclosure tort as far too limited in the Information Age to protect
much privacy.16 2 Unlike Posner, they find inherent value in protection
against disclosure: it encourages individual autonomy, freedom of
association, and even peoples' security.163 The tort does not offer
sufficient protection against disclosure, however, given the overbroad
newsworthiness defense.' 64 Thus, it should be reenergized for our
157. Id. at 419; see also Posner, The Economics of Privacy, supra note 152, at
408 ("why people should want to suppress such facts is mysterious from an
economic standpoint."). But see Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less, supra note
153, at 1032-43 (contending that argument against PDPF from critics, like Posner
and Richard Epstein, that call for disclosure for the purpose of making accurate
judgments about others is flawed because more information does not necessarily
bring accurate judgments, as judgments are generally made quickly and out of
context; the good of concealing one's past can often outweigh societal benefits of
disclosure).
158. Posner, The Right ofPrivacy, supra note 152, at 412-18.
159. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, supra note 18, at 1347-52 (arguing
that PDPF is not very useful because defenses swallow it; it should be replaced by
the intellectual privacy concept that Brandeis created later in life); Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, supra note 153, at 404.
160. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, supra note 152, at 9.
161. Richards & Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law, supra note 138, at 1889
(arguing that Prosser solidified privacy torts but, despite this service, he gave no
guidance to privacy tort development for Information Age).
162. See, e.g., id.; Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less, supra note
153(contending that First Amendment should not always win when clashing with
PDPF; additionally, more information does not necessarily bring accurate
judgments, and the good of concealing one's past can outweigh societal benefits of
disclosure); Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 153 (arguing that we are
still unsure what privacy means and when it deserves protection; given changing
technology, a bottom-up contextualized approach should redefine privacy).
163. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy, supra note 103, at 530-33.
164. See Richards, The Puzzle ofBrandeis, supra note 18, at 1345-47.
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technological era by moving beyond Prosser's limited definition of
privacy and by: (1) recognizing the social contexts in which
information is shared with individuals (not just whether the
information is public or private); (2) developing a more sophisticated
conception of harm to readily encompass psychological injury;
(3) better understanding the relationship between free speech and
privacy (to see that they are not always in conflict, as Prosser
assumed); and (4) understanding new duties and their sources in tort
law, particularly regarding computer databases and similar
technology. 16 5 Further, in concurrence with Posner, intellectual
privacy should be protected.166 Finally, privacy protections should
expand not only in tort but by statute, contract, and by reshaping the
meaning of privacy in light of which disclosures should be
protected. 167
As far as I can tell, neither of these proposals has taken hold in
courts, although Richards and Solove's proposals might need more
time to ripen. For now, notwithstanding the myriad proposals of tort
and privacy scholars, Prosser's conception stands as the dominant
common law protection against disclosure.
2. FirstAmendment Concerns
Little has changed in the disclosure tort's free speech and free
press limitations since Warren and Brandeis wrote The Right to
Privacy.168 Nonetheless, shortly after the tort's addition to the
Restatement (Second), scholars began analyzing the tort on First
Amendment grounds, and they have not stopped.169 The Supreme
165. Richards & Solove, Prosser'sPrivacyLaw, supra note 1388, at 1922-23.
166. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, supra note 18, at 1347-52; Richards,
IntellectualPrivacy, supra note 153.
167. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, .... supra note 153 (arguing that
PDPF is poor vehicle for modem privacy problems, just as it has been weak against
First Amendment)
168. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73-74, 80
(Ga. 1905); Note, The Right to Privacy Today, 43 HARv. L. REV. 297 (1929).
Warren and Brandeis were the first to note First Amendment concerns with their
public interest limitation. See also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 214-16 (1890).
169. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 151; Patrick J. McNulty, The Public

264

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Court has since decided two First Amendment cases addressing
statutory disclosure protection, Cox Broadcasting v. Cohnl 70 and
Florida Star v. B.J.F.'7 1 Sadly for scholars, almost no post-1965
scholarship is cited for the majorities' opinions, and the decisions did
little to change, rather than clarify, the disclosure tort. 72
The Court in Cox Broadcastingheld that applying Georgia's law
prohibiting disclosure of a rape victim's name to a reporter who found
the name in a publicly available indictment was a free press
violation.173 While in FloridaStar, the Court held that the press was
free to disclose information in the public sphere (here, a police report),
even if the information is otherwise protected by statute. 174 After Cox,
scholars said that the newsworthiness defense had all but completely
abolished the disclosure tort.s7 5 The Florida Star commentary
Disclosure of PrivateFacts: There Is Life after Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 93,
98 (2001); Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical
Approach, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97 (2001); Volokh,
supra note 150; John A. Jurata, Jr., Note, The Tort that Refuses to Go Away: The
Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
489 (1999); Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An
Exploration of the PrivateDomain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425 (1996); Richard A. Epstein,
A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. L.
STUDIES 665 (1980); Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure
Tort and the FirstAmendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64
IOWA L. REV. 232 (1978); Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy:
The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974);
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968);
Bloustein, supra note 142.
170. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
171. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
172. In addition to citing Prosser and Warren & Brandeis, the Court in Cox
cited three law review articles in a single footnote for the proposition that there is a
zone of privacy surrounding individuals in which the state could protect its citizens
from intrusion by the press-a privacy-expansive proposition not closely followed
by the Court. In Florida Star, the only references to scholarly influence are to
Warren and Brandeis's article, Prosser's (and coauthors') torts casebook noted in the
dissent, and one law review piece (on punitive damages for libel) in a dissenters'
footnote. In neither of these cases are post-Prosser scholars given much weight.
173. Cox, 420 U.S. at 495-97.
174. The FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 541.
175. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First
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produced more grieving among scholars,176 some of which still
continues in attempts to reform the tort. 177 Other scholars closer to the
truth have said that Florida Star adds no restraint that Warren,
Brandeis, and Prosser did not, and that the disclosure tort actually
encourages the same values supported by the First Amendment.1 78
Some scholars, however, have argued that the Supreme Court
should abolish or severely limit the disclosure tort as
Perhaps the oddest story among these
unconstitutional. 17 9
constitutional attacks is that of Erwin Chemerinsky. In 2006,
Chemerinsky extolled the virtues of Brandeis, and his tort, lamenting
the fact that the Supreme Court had not yet supported such a right in
cases like Cox Broadcastingand FloridaStar and calling for "judicial
protection of a constitutional right to informational privacy and
Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976) (arguing that PDPF had all but been
swallowed by the newsworthiness / public interest doctrine).
176. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, FreePress v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost
of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1223 (1990); J.R. Rolfs, Note, The Florida
Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of the Endfor the Tort ofPublic Disclosure, 1990 Wis.
L. REV. 1107 (1990); Lorelei Van Wey, Note, PrivateFacts Tort: The End Is Here,
52 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (1991). But see Ruth Gavison, Too Early for a Requiem:
Warren and Brandeis Were Right on Privacy vs. Free Speech, 43 S.C. L. REV. 437
(1991) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has been extremely cautious and has not
held that any recovery for truthful publication is inconsistent with the First
Amendment.").
177. See Patrick J. McNulty, The Public Disclosureof PrivateFacts: There Is
Life After Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 93 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme
Court wrongly decided FloridaStar and that, even if it is not, the disclosure tort will
continue to apply to facts not already in public domain).
178. See, e.g., Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 104; Solove, The
Virtues ofKnowing Less, supra note 153.
179. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Truthful Speech: Narrowing the
Tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 423 (2007) (arguing
that civil liability for disclosure is objectionable under the First Amendment because
truthful speech should not be censured); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 291 (1982) (arguing that the disclosure tort should be ended, as its
constitutional problems are overwhelming; if it does continue, the meaning of
private information and newsworthiness would have to be severely limited); Epstein,
supra note 169 (arguing that erasing the disclosure tort might be best because of its
constitutional problems and because it gives courts the function of deciding the
weight and significance of true information about plaintiff).
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greater safeguards through tort law and statutes." 80 The very next
year, he called for the utter abolishment of the disclosure tort in all
cases except those involving a risk to personal safety and called on the
Supreme Court to expand Cox Broadcasting and FloridaStar to end
the tort.'8 1 This unexplained turnaround is astounding but has thus
far, like other calls for change, yielded no practical result.
B. JudicialExpansion of the Disclosure Tort
in the Face of Scholarship
Despite often-furious attempts, neither constitutional nor tort
scholars have induced practical change to the disclosure tort for
decades. In fact, the tort in most states looks as it did in the early
1970s, although the Supreme Court has clarified the trends.
Further, courts have increasingly adopted the tort over time, even
though scholars were trying to change or abolish it. By 1940, twelve
states had explicitly recognized the right to privacy under the common
law, and two had adopted it by legislation.1 82 Six states had refused it,
and the remaining twenty-eight had yet to decide.' 83 By the early
1950s, the number of states accepting the right had expanded to
sixteen by one countl 8 4 and nineteen (plus three who recognized
privacy in statute) by another.' 8 5 According to Prosser, twenty-seven
(plus four by statute) had recognized the right by 1960.186
Expansion continues. By 2010, as to the disclosure tort alone,
only six states (New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska,
Montana, and Virginia) reject the common law cause of action. 187
180. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis's Right to Privacy, 45
L.J. 643, 656 (2006).
181. Chemerinsky, Protecting Truthful Speech: Narrowing the Tort of Public
Disclosure ofPrivateFacts,supra note 179.
182. Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39
MICH. L. REv. 526, 529-30 (1941).
183. Id.
184. Leon R. Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope, and
Limitations, 27 NOTRE DAME L. 499, 505 (1952).
185. Joseph R. Grodin, Note, The Right of Publicity: A DoctrinalInnovation,
62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1123 (1953).
186. Prosser, supra note 112, at 386-87.
187. MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER, MEDIA PRIVACY & RELATED LAW
BRANDEIS
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Four others (Alaska, Mississippi, South Dakota, and Wyoming) have
yet to definitively speak on the matter, and many protect particular
private matters by statute.' 8 In other words, forty states explicitly
recognize disclosure claims, and most of them follow Prosser's
conception as found in the Restatement (Second), rather than the
conception of would-be modifiers.189
CONCLUSION

Edward White believes that tort doctrine follows prevailing legal
ideology, which is heavily influenced by legal scholars.190 Taking this
as true-and surmising that the disclosure tort still exists in its current
form because of path dependence-perhaps its accumulating
inefficiency (as Posner and others argue) will eventually lead to its
expansion, modification, or abolishment. Such change might occur if
consensus-oriented and neo-conceptualist judges (who apply law
because the last court did) are replaced with neo-realists (who are
willing to change law to meet societal demands) or efficiency-seeking
economists. Perhaps then the picture might shift as it did when the
guard changed from formalist to realist in the early twentieth century.
If, on the other hand, judges do not plan to listen, then all of the
well-researched proposals meant to increase efficiency, promote free
speech and a free press, and expand privacy protection, will have been
made in vain-at best a conversation with other scholars, perhaps
garnering a fleeting footnote in a reported case. A small and mostly
elite group of scholars had privacy and the disclosure tort in their
partial control for decades, and they had a practical dialogue with
courts that changed the law. Whether such a change to the disclosure
tort will ever happen again is impossible to say, but if the last halfcentury is any indication, scholars are going to say a lot of brilliant
things to decision makers who are too busy or too doctrinally content
to care.
Scholars who seek to change the law should either take a new
approach to this tort, move on to less established doctrines for which
2010-11: MLRC 50-STATE SURVEY 1548-53 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
188. Id. (See description of each state's legislation throughout.)
189. Richards & Solove, Prosser'sPrivacyLaw, supra note 138, at 1890.
190.

WHITE, supra note 43, at xxiv.
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judges are willing to seek academic help, start speaking directly to
chambers by filing even more amicus briefs, or get serious about
creating a public relations tsunami such as they did in the Affordable
Care Act case.191 Whatever they do, academics seeking practical
change would be wise to speak practically to the bench and bar in
hopes of rekindling a dying dialogue between the academy and the
courtroom-a symbiosis 92 that will hopefully consist of more than
articles on "the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary
approaches in eighteenth century Bulgaria."l 93

191. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). As
Professor Katyal notes, "[t]he plaintiffs' strategy to attack the ACA . .. was not an
attempt by an academic to influence the Court solely through law review articles.
Rather, they employed a massive PR blanket-including think tank presentations,
congressional testimony, media outreach, and blogging." Katyal, supra note 4, at
1191.
192. WHITE, supra note 43, at 39 (noting that legal scientists "established a
symbiotic relationship" with courts).
193. Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Responds after Chief Justice Roberts
Disses Legal Scholarship, ABA Journal (Jul. 7, 2011, 5:29 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law-prof responds-afterchiefjusticerob
ertsdisseslegalscholarship/.%20Rule%2018.

